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bstract
This study analyzes the effect of income on repeat criminal victimization in Brazil using data from the 2009 National Household
ample Survey and its special supplement on victimization and access to justice. Two count-data models were estimated for four types
f crime: theft, robbery, attempted theft/robbery, and physical assault. A positive nonlinear effect of income on repeat victimization
or the three types of property crimes and a negative nonlinear effect of income on physical assault were observed.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: K42; C25
eywords: Repeat victimization; Crime; Violence; Income
esumo
Analisamos o efeito da renda na vitimizac¸ão criminal repetida utilizando dados da PNAD 2009 e do seu suplemento especial
obre vitimizac¸ão e acesso à justic¸a no Brasil. Foram estimados dois modelos de dados de contagem para quatro tipos de crime:
urto, roubo, tentativa de furto/roubo e agressão física. Concluímos que há uma relac¸ão não-linear positiva entre renda e vitimizac¸ão
epetida para crimes contra a propriedade, e uma relac¸ão não-linear negativa para agressão física.
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1.  Introduction
In the criminal universe, phenomena rarely follow a normal distribution. It is rather a universe governed by “con-
centrations.” A small part of the territory tends to accumulate a large proportion of crime (hot spots). A small number
of criminals tend to commit a disproportionate amount of crime (predators). Victimization also follows this trend,
considering that a small group of victims is usually the preferred target of a disproportionate amount of offenders.
Situational criminology suggests that these concentrations are explained by a combination of excessive risk factors
and the absence of protective factors. Unmonitored areas with intense circulation of people and goods, low visibility,
and signs of disorder become more attractive for crime. Low-weight infants living in homes with unmarried teenage
mothers and children raised by lone parents or who drop out of school early are more likely to become criminals.
Unmarried young people, who often tend to leave their home unguarded, to consume alcohol, and to be careless with
their fancy cell phones are preferred prey for criminals.
From the standpoint of public crime prevention policies, these concentrations are advantageous, as they make it
possible for resources to be allocated to areas and populations at risk through focused interventions, reducing risk factors
and increasing protective factors. Hot spots that are appropriately identified can be more protected by police or cameras,
better lighting, better cleaning services. Tertiary prevention programs – designed for people already involved with the
criminal justice system – can focus on strengthening educational and therapeutic treatments for young offenders. Police
departments can develop courses, booklets and guidelines on preventive measures that could be taken by owners of
establishments that are attacked often. The problem is that it is difficult, or even impossible, to change many risk
factors. You can improve the surveillance of an area, but a central shopping promenade might be always used for the
same purposes and activities, implying risk. You can improve the employability of young offenders, but you cannot
modify their age, gender, IQ, or their past involvement in crime. Victims can change risk behaviors and install security
equipment, but there are intrinsic characteristics related to location, lifestyle, and architectural design, among others,
which cannot be modified. That is why increasing the number of protective factors can shift some crimes to other areas
or victims, but some of them will inevitably remain concentrated in the same locations and targets.
Many previous studies analyzed why some locations are more attractive to criminals than others and why certain
types of crimes tend to concentrate in other locations (Tseloni et al., 2003, 2004), while other studies investigated
risk factors associated with the criminal history of repeat offenders. Very little has been written, however, about the
phenomenon of repeat victimization (being victim of more than one crime of the same type). Which variables could
help us understand why victimization mainly affects a small percentage of victims, even though it is a relatively rare
phenomenon?
Repeat victimization has some known characteristics. Most people are not victimized at all, but those who are remain
at a high risk of being victimized again. Thus, prior victimization is one of the best indicators of future victimization.
Moreover, recurrence can be rapid. In repeat victimization, the same type of criminal incident is experienced by the
same victim or target within a specific period of time, as within a year, for example. Thus, repeat victimization refers
to the total amount of offenses experienced by a victim or target, including the initial offense and subsequent ones.
Previous evidence of the causes of repeat victimization in Brazil was uniquely found by Carvalho and Lavor (2008)
using data from a national survey carried out in 1988. The focus of their study was particularly on the effect of income
inequality on property crime (composed of theft and robbery). Our study is focused on empirical advances in the
modeling of causes of repeat victimization. In particular, the main objective of this paper is analyzing the effect of
income on repeat criminal victimization by types of crime from an economic perspective.
Victimization is a complex process and, consequently, one that is difficult to be modeled empirically. There is
no single well-structured theory to guide empirical analyses in this field. Studies have usually been based on two
approaches that consider victims as objects of study, highlighting the importance of their “lifestyle” and the creation
of “opportunities” for criminals to commit their crimes. Empirical analyses have been mainly based on the theoretical
framework proposed by Cohen et al. (1981). Using data from some previous studies, these authors expanded and
formalized a sociological theory (which they refer to as the “opportunity model of predatory victimization”) to explain
victimization risk. According to this approach, there are five factors strongly related to risk: exposure, proximity,
guardianship, target attractiveness, and definitional proprieties of specific crimes.
Some factors with a bearing on repeat victimization can have a different effect according to the type of crime
in question, especially if the nature of the crime is considered, i.e. property crimes or crimes against a person. In
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articular, income is widely debated in the literature. We are accustomed to associating crime with poverty, which is
rue in connection with homicides and other violent crimes against a person. Thus, a negative relationship between
ncome and victimization is plausible. In the case of property crimes, however, its effect is ambiguous. On the one
and, higher income reduces the propensity to engage in crime, but on the other it produces more attractive targets, as
roperty crimes are primarily crimes of opportunity. The higher the income, the more goods a victim has, the greater
he criminal opportunities. But this relationship is not necessarily linear: low-income individuals or places are less
ttractive, but after a certain threshold a higher income tends to lead to the adoption of more defensive measures against
rime through strategies and equipment designed to “block opportunities,” such as video cameras, alarms, and security
evices. In short, wealthier individuals are on the one hand more economically attractive to criminals, but on the other
hey have stronger reasons and more money to spend on their own security, especially after being victimized for the
rst time. Therefore, the effect of income on repeat victimization is ambiguous, but its net effect can be observed
mpirically.
We believe that the sociological approach cited above is also helpful as a framework to understand the process of
epeat victimization, i.e. why some people are victims of the same type of crime two or more times. Our analysis is
lso based on a simple victimization model proposed by Gaviria and Pagés (2002), where an individual’s wealth is the
ocus. In particular, the hypotheses tested here are: (i) income has a positive nonlinear effect on the number of times
n individual was victimized by property crimes, and (ii) income has a negative nonlinear effect on crimes against a
erson.
The main improvements made here in relation to the previous empirical study are the following ones: the most
ecent victimization data from a nationwide sample survey carried out in Brazil were used; estimations for four types
f crimes (theft, robbery, attempted theft/robbery, physical assault) were performed separately. We emphasize that
hysical assault is an aggravated physical aggression against a person and the three other crime types are property
rimes; and the design of complex surveys was taken into account, since the actual variance tends to be underestimated
hen the sample design is ignored.
The next section presents a brief description of a useful theoretical framework for discussing the effect of income
n repeat victimization. Section 3 provides details about the empirical modeling, while results are discussed in Section
. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
.  Income  and  victimization
Gaviria and Pagés (2002) proposed a simple victimization model that, together with the approach proposed by
ohen et al. (1981), is very useful for the empirical modeling that we will do in the next section and for understanding
he results presented in Section 4.
Justus and Kassouf (2013) summarized the model’s framework. It involves two actors (citizens and criminals) and
wo stages. In the first stage, citizens (who are only different from one another according to their wealth level) decide
ow much they will spend on private protection. In the second stage, citizens are matched with criminals who in turn
ecide whether or not to commit a crime upon observing the wealth (w) of their prospective victims and their investment
n private protection (e). Assuming that criminals make their decisions on the mere basis of pecuniary factors, we can
ay that they weigh two factors: if they are successful in committing the crime, they will be rewarded with a portion
f the victim’s wealth, given by α  times w  (α  ≤  1); and if they fail – the probability of which is p  – they pay a penalty
quivalent to F. In an economic approach, failure in crime means that the criminal was charged, arrested, convicted,
nd punished as provided for in the law.
Three additional assumptions are made: the probability of being caught is assumed to increase monotonically
ith spending on private protection (i.e. p = p(e), where p′ > 0); victims and criminals are considered as risk-neutral;
riminals are assumed to have complete information, as they observe their victim’s wealth and are able to correctly
nfer their risks of being caught.
In this context, a criminal will attempt to victimize citizen i  who possesses a wealth of wi and spent ei on private
rotection as long as the following inequality holds
(1 −  p[ei])αwi −  p[ei]F  >  0 (1)
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Since all citizens are potential victims for criminals, a given citizen i can avoid becoming a victim if he or she spends
at least hi on private protection, where hi indicates the spending on protection that would make a criminal indifferent
in relation to attempting to steal from i  because the risk involved would be too high. In sum,
hi =  p(−1)
[
αwi
αwi +  F
]
(2)
where p(−1) is the inverse of function p that links private spending on protection to the probability of a criminal being
punished.
Eq. (2) gives, for each wealth level, the minimal spending on private protection required to prevent crime by deterring
criminals. Therefore, citizens must decide whether they will spend hi on their own protection or will not invest on
protecting themselves at all. They will spend hi only if the prospective losses of being victimized are not exceeded.
That is, if
hi ≤  αwi.  (3)
Wealthier persons would need, ceteris paribus, to spend more on private protection to avoid being victimized. This
is the conclusion reached based on the first derivative of Eq. (2) with respect to w,
dhi
dwi
= αF(F  +  αwi)2p′[h]
> 0 (4)
But are wealthier persons willing to spend more on protection to avoid being victimized? Or will they instead prefer
to bear some risk? The answer depends on the second derivative of h  with respect to w,
d2hi
dw2i
=  −α
2F (2(F  +  αwi)p′[hi]2 +  Fp′′[hi])
(F  +  αwi)4p′[hi]3
(5)
Eq. (5) will be negative, unless the second derivative of p  is both negative and large in absolute value. So the wealthy
will routinely invest in private security to avoid being victimized unless p  exhibits sharp diminishing returns to scale.
If the marginal returns of an extra amount spent on private protection against crime are very low, the wealthy will
find it too expensive to reach the necessary level of protection to avoid being victimized and will rationally decide to
bear some measure of risk. Otherwise, they will spend the portion of their wealth deemed necessary to avoid being
victimized.
In summary, according to the approach adopted by Gaviria and Pagés (2002), the wealth of individuals determines
both their economic attractiveness to becoming victims and their capacity to protect themselves from criminals by
paying for their protection.
Justus and Kassouf (2013) argue that according to the findings of Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Cohen et al. (1981)
and Gaviria and Pagés (2002) it is to be expected that, given the opportunity cost of crime, the likelihood of failure
determined by government spending on public safety, the penalties provided for in the law, and the costs involved in
planning and committing a crime, criminals will pick their victims based on their evaluation of those who are more
economically attractive for the criminal act. In this subjective evaluation, criminals take into account both the wealth of
potential victims and the likelihood of failure as determined by how much they spend on their own protection. By doing
this, criminals optimize the expected return on crime. Therefore, the behavior of potential victims has a direct bearing
on the optimization process that is implicit in the rational choice of a criminal. Thus, if the principle of economic
rationality on the part of criminals holds, the risk of victimization increases with wealth. However, as pointed out by
Gaviria and Pagés (2002), wealthier individuals have stronger reasons and more money to spend on their own security
to protect themselves from criminals. On the other hand, poorer individuals lack the financial means to pay for their
protection in order to avoid being victimized, but they are less economically attractive potential victims to criminals
than wealthier individuals.
Table 1 shows some selected studies that analyzed the effect of income on single victimization and repeat victim-
ization. In sum, the effect observed in this previous literature is positive for property crimes and negative for crimes
against a person.
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Table 1
Selected studies about the effect of income on victimization and repeat victimization.
Study Country Sample Time Crime Effect
Single victimization
Barslund et al. (2007) Mozambique Individuals
Household
2002 and 2003 Burglary
Lacerny
Assault
Positive
Positive
Positive
Gaviria and Pagés (2002) Latin America Individuals
Country
1996–1998 Property crime Positive
Levitt (1999) USA Individuals 1990 Crimes against a
person
Positive
Madalozzo and Furtado
(2011)
Brazil Individuals 2003, 2005 and
2008
Theft/robbery Positive
Di Tella et al. (2002) Argentina Household 1990–2000 Robbery Positive
Justus and Kassouf (2013) Brazil Household
Individuals
2003, 2005 and
2008
Theft/robbery Positive
Scorzafave et al. (2015) Rural Brazil Individuals 1988 and 2009 Theft
Robbery
Attempted
Assault
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Repeat victimization
Carvalho and Lavor (2008) Brazil Individuals 1988 Theft/robbery Positive
Lauritsen and Quinet (1995) USA Individuals young
and adolescent
1977 Assault
Robbery
Negative
Positive
O
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i
vutlaw et al. (2002) USA people 2000 Property crime Positive
.  Methodology
.1.  Data
The first difficulty in investigating the causes of crime is that reliable information is hard to come by (or virtually
on-existent). Existing official data, especially those available in police records, consist only in underestimated figures
or actually committed crimes. The number of criminal occurrences is underestimated because many of them are not
ctually registered in a formal police report. A police report involves assessments and decisions of various individuals
nvolved in an event seen as a “police matter.”
Actually, as suggested by victimization surveys conducted in several countries, there is clear evidence that the actual
rime rate is significantly higher than the one reported based on official data. A victimization survey is based on a
andom sample of a given population, which is asked about occurrences of certain types of crimes in a given period of
ime. Besides allowing for better measurement of the actual crime rate, among other advantages, these surveys make
t possible for one to know the characteristics of the victims and provide important inputs for empirical studies on the
auses of criminal victimization.
We used cross-sectional data from special supplements on food security, victimization and justice included in the
ational Household Sample Survey of 2009 (2009 PNAD in Brazilian acronym) carried out by the Brazilian Institute
or Geography and Statistics (IBGE in Brazilian acronym). Our empirical models were estimated taking into account
he design of complex surveys, since the actual variance tends to be underestimated when such sample design is
gnored.1
It must be said that our data set offers at least three advantages as compared to official crime figures: its coverage is
ation-wide, it allows for the effects of household income, education, and other factors on the number of crimes to be
dentified based on non-victimized individuals, and it minimizes issues related to measurement errors of the response
ariable (i.e. crime), a common problem with official statistics resulting from under-reporting.
1 For details see Skinner et al. (1998).
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Table 2
Frequency distributions of the count of victimizations by type of crime (%).
Count Theft Robbery Attempted theft/robb. Physical assault
0 96.09 96.37 94.67 98.47
1 3.02 2.86 3.95 1.13
2 0.57 0.53 0.91 0.20
3 0.19 0.16 0.30 0.09
4 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.03
5 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
6 or more 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05
N = 318, 759.
3.2.  Empirical  models
The response variable of the empirical models is a count-data variable: the amount  of  times  an  individual  was
victimized during  one  year. Models for four types of crimes were performed separately: robbery, theft, attempted
theft/robbery, and physical assault. Table 2 shows the distribution of victimization count data by type of crime.
The next step is very difficult, as it is not trivial to specify a model without a well-structured crime causation theory.
Fortunately, we can use the work of Cohen et al. (1981) and Gaviria and Pagés (2002) as a starting point.
We emphasize that for each selected explanatory variable there are several approaches that try and explain why
and how the risk of victimization is affected. For instance, men are more victimized because they tend to adopt risky
behaviors due to the cultural roles assigned to them or to their higher testosterone levels. Whites and nonwhites tend
to live in different areas in cities where different crime levels prevail. Young people have a more active lifestyle that
exposes them to greater risks, and married people tend to spend more time in their homes. Denser urban areas facilitate
anonymity and make crime less detectable. People who study or work spend more time on the street, increasing their
chances of victimization, and higher-income individuals carry more attractive goods than others.
In this study, the logarithm  for  monthly  per  capita  household  income, ln(income), is the predictor of our greatest
interest. This measure is a control for income and also for the number of individuals within a family, especially for
property crimes.
Besides the 27 dummy variables that were used to take into account possible regional differences among Brazilian
states, the other dependent variables that are common to the four models are: age in years (age) and the square of
this variable (agesq); a dummy variable to distinguish gender, which assumes value 1 for males and 0 for females
(man); a dummy variable to distinguish color or race (white), which assumes value 1 for white or Asian people and
0 for black, mulatto or indigenous people; a dummy variable for location of residence, which is 1 for urban areas and
0 otherwise (urban); a dummy for type of residence, which is 1 for house and 0 for apartment (house); a dummy
variable for marital status, which is 1 for married and 0 for single people (married); a dummy variable for student
status, which is 1 for students and 0 otherwise (student); years of schooling (school); a dummy variable which is
1 if the person owns a car or motorcycle and 0 otherwise (ownvehi). Regarding types of crime, a difference is that
for property crimes hours of work outside one’s home in a week are used, while for physical assault only a dummy
variable is used that assumes 1 if the individual is employed and 0 if otherwise (works). Table 3 describes all these
variables in detail.
Because the dependent variable is discrete, its distribution places probability mass at nonnegative integer values
only. Fully parametric formulations of count models accommodate this property distribution.2
3.3.  Econometric  proceduresThe modeling exercise began with the standard linear regression model, which is estimated by OLS,
yi =  x′iβ  +  εi, i =  1,  . . ., n,  (6)
2 Cameron et al. (2009) and Kleiber and Zeileis (2008) are convenient references for the methodological background for count-data model. A mix
of both references was used in the next subsection.
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Table 3
Definition and summary statistics of the variables.
Variable Definition Mean Linearized std. error
Responses
theft Counts of victimizations by theft. 0.0548 0.0011
robbery Counts of victimizations by robbery. 0.0483 0.0008
attempted theft/robb. Counts of victimizations by attempted theft/robbery. 0.0761 0.0013
physical assault Counts of victimizations by physical assault. 0.0027 0.0009
Explanatory
man 1 if man and 0 if women. 0.4837 0.0008
white 1 if white or yellow (Asian) and 0 if black, mulatto
or indigenous people.
0.4893 0.0027
age Age in years. 360.86 0.0578
married 1 if married and 0 otherwise. 0.4127 0.0019
urban 1 if one lives in an urban area and 0 if one lives in a
rural area.
0.8425 0.0047
house 1 if one lives in a house and 0 if one lives in an
apartment.
0.9141 0.0021
student 1 if one studies and 0 otherwise. 0.2357 0.0010
school Years of schooling. 70.14 0.0261
hwork Hours of work in a week. 210.59 0.0634
works 1 if employed and 0 if unemployed or out of the
labor force.
0.5736 0.0015
ownveh 1 if one owns a car or a motorcycle and 0 otherwise. 0.4968 0.0028
ln(income) Logarithm for monthly per capita household income. 60.02 0.0070
N
w
o
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t
μ
a
f
w
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l = 318, 759.
here yi is the number of times an individual i  was victimized in one year, xi is the column vector of covariates for
bservation i, which is described later, β  is a k ×  1 vector of regression coefficients and εi is the random disturbance.
There are three aspects in the linear regression model for a conditionally normally distributed response y: (i) linear
redictor ηi =  x′iβ, through which μi = E(yi|xi) depends on the k ×  1 vectors xi of observations and β  of parameters; (ii)
he distribution of the dependent variable yi|xi is N(μi, σ2); and (iii) the expected response is equal to linear predictor,
i = ηi.
The class of generalized linear models (GLMs) extends (i) and (iii) to more general families of distributions for y
nd to more general relations between E(yi|xi) and the linear predictor than the identity. Specifically, (yi|xi) may now
ollow a density or probability mass function of the type
f  (y; θ,  φ) =  exp
{
yθ −  bθ
φ
+  c(y; φ)
}
(7)
here θ, referred to as the canonical parameter, depends on the linear predictor, and the additional parameter φ, referred
o as the dispersion parameter, is often known. In addition, the linear predictor and the expectation of y are now related
y a monotonic transformation (referred to as the link function of the GLM),
g(μi) =  ηi.
For fixed θ, (7) describes a linear exponential family. Then, the distribution of the dependent variable yi|xi is a linear
xponential family, a class that includes the Poisson and binomial distribution.
Thus, in addition to other possibilities, the family of GLMs extends the applicability of linear-model ideas to data
here responses are binary or counts.
We start with a standard model for count data, which is a Poisson regression. As observed above, it is a generalizedinear model. Using the canonical link for the Poisson family (the log link), the model is
E(yi|xi) =  μi =  exp(x′iβ) (8)
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In a Poisson distribution, the variance equals the mean (equidispersion). It is necessary to check this built-in feature.
Poisson regressions are often plagued by overdispersion, which means that the variance is greater than the linear
predictor permits.
Overdispersion can be tested for by considering the alternative hypothesis
Var(yi|xi) =  μi +  α  · h(μi),  (9)
where h  is a positive function of μi. Overdispersion corresponds to α > 0 and underdispersion to α  < 0.
A common specification of the transformation function h  is h(μ) = μ2, and it was used. Therefore, the formal test
of the null hypothesis of equidispersion, Var(yi|xi) = E(yi|xi) for all i, against the alternative of overdispersion, is based
on the equation
Var(yi|xi) =  E(yi|xi) +  α2E(yi|xi).  (10)
H0 : α  = 0 was tested against H1 : α  > 0 implemented by an auxiliary OLS regression of the generated dependent variable,
{(yi −  μˆ)2 −  yi}/  μˆ  on μˆ, without an intercept term, and performing a t  test for whether the coefficient of μˆ  is zero,
which is asymptotically standard normal under the null hypothesis.
The t statistics are 12.16 for theft, 8.91 for robbery, 15.93 for attempted theft/robbery, and 10.30 for physical assault,
with one-sided p-value of 0.000 for all models. The results suggest that the Poisson model for the victimization data
is not well specified, as there appears to be a substantial amount of overdispersion.
A possible solution is to consider a more flexible distribution that does not impose equality of mean and variance.
The Negative Binomial is the most widely used distribution in this context. It may be considered a mixture distribution
arising from a Poisson distribution with random scale, the latter following a gamma distribution. Its probability mass
function is
f  (y; θ,  φ) = Γ (θ  +  y)
Γ  (θ)y!) +
μyθθ
(μ  +  θ)y+θ ,  y  =  1,  2,  .  . ., μ >  0,  θ > 0.  (11)
It must be said that the variance of the Negative Binomial distribution is given by
Var(y; θ,  φ) =  μ  + 1
θ
μ2, (12)
which is of the form (3) with h(μ) = μ2 and α  = 1/θ.
For estimating the Negative Binomial model (NB) with a known θ, the shape parameter of the fitted Negative
Binomial distribution for the four models (i.e., types of crimes), ˆθ, suggested that there is a considerable amount of
overdispersion, corroborating with the results of the test for overdispersion.
A problem often faced with count-data regressions is that the number of zeros is often much larger than a Poisson
or Negative Binomial regression permits. In fact, Table 2 indicates that our data contain a large number of zeros. For
instance, at least 94.7% of all people were not victimized. Thus, models for zero-inflated data are better.
The Zero-Inflated model was originally proposed to handle excess zeros relative to the Poisson model. It supplements
a count density, f2(·), with a binary process with a density of f1(·). If the binary process takes on a value of 0 with a
probability of f1(0), then y = 0. If the binary process takes on a value of 1 with a probability of f1(1), then y  takes on the
count values 0, 1, 2, .  . .  from the count density f2(·). This lets zero counts occur as a realization of the binary process
and as a realization of the count process when the binary random variable takes on a value of 1.
Suppressing regressors for simplicity, the Zero-Inflated model has a density of
f  (y) =
{
f1(0) +  {1 −  f1(0)}f2(0) if y  =  0
{1 −  f1(0)}f2(0) if y  ≥  0
(13)
In our empirical modeling, the f1(0) was parameterized through a Probit model and a Negative Binomial distribution
for the count component was used. The Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) model is a mixture specification with
a negative binomial count component and an additional point mass at zero.
We estimated a regression of victimization on all further variables for the count part and modeled the inflation
component as a function of man  and white. Apart from these variables, the previous study performed by Carvalho
and Lavor (2008) takes into account a dummy variable for owning a TV set. Here, this control was not used because
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oday almost all people have a TV set in their home. Moreover, the dummy variables for the Brazilian states were used
s variables in the inflation component.
The LR test of Vuong to discriminate between the NB and ZINB models (see Cameron et al., 2009, pp. 586–590)
as applied. The test statistic is standard normally distributed, with large positive values favoring the ZINB model and
arge negative values favoring the NB model. In this study, the test statistic is a large positive value for the four models
i.e. types of crime) with a one-sided very small p-value. So the results of ZINB models are better. Table 4 shows the
oefficients estimated from repeat victimization models.
.  Results  and  discussion
Our model includes several variables that correlate significantly with repeat victimization. Several theories – inspired
y situational criminology theories related to lifestyles, rational choice, psycho-biology, etc. – try to explain how
eople act to increase or decrease repeat victimization. The direction of this relationship is, however, often ambiguous,
ccording to the theoretical perspective one adopts. Moreover, the meaning may be different, depending on whether
e’re talking about property or personal victimization. Thus, we cannot determine unequivocally which theories are
orrect or incorrect and we must rely only on observed empirical evidence.
In this context, before discussing our results, it is interesting to summarize some postulates in the literature (Cohen
t al., 1981, and others) regarding theoretical relationships between victimization and the main variables included in
he empirical model.
First, men adopt more risky behaviors (drinking, carrying a gun) and have a culture of violent conflict resolution
n the case of physical assault that increases the rate of repeat victimization. On the other hand, adult males are less
ubject to domestic violence, given the greater physical vulnerability of women. The higher income of white or Asian
eople in Brazil makes them more attractive targets for criminals. Therefore, the distribution of racial groups in space
s not random: white and Asian people usually live in areas that are more exposed to property crimes, but less exposed
o crimes against persons (physical assault). On the other hand, ethnic groups with higher income and that invest
n self-protection are less exposed to the risk of repeat victimization. However, attractive targets for criminals were
ontrolled for income. Therefore, the risk of victimization should not be different among racial groups, but it should
e considered that controls are almost invariably imperfect.
Second, young people spend more time on the street and take more risky behaviors in terms of drinking, carrying
 gun, etc. Higher testosterone levels can also increase the risk of victimization by physical assault, as well as hasty
eactions. Young people rely less on police, increasing the chances of impunity for perpetrators of crimes. On the other
and, they tend to travel in groups, reducing their exposure to risk. The physical vulnerability of elderly people can, in
urn, expose them to a greater risk of victimization.
Third, married people spend more time at home, implying less risky behaviors and more intense surveillance of
heir homes and other property. Regarding family size, larger families are associated with lower incomes, reducing
heir attractiveness, but large families increase the surveillance of their property. On the other hand, high density (many
esidents in the same space) can enhance the risk of domestic conflicts.
Fourth, individuals living in urban areas are more anonymous, have a greater supply of goods, and are less exposed
o the possibility or victims running into offenders more than once, reducing the possibility of detection of crime and
unishment.
Fifth, common houses are particularly vulnerable to theft and residential burglary because of their architecture.
n the other hand, this perceived vulnerability can encourage their owners to protect or guard them more intensely.
ictimized owners increase the level of post-incident protection, reducing their exposure to repeat victimization.
Sixth, with regard to education, students spend more time on the streets (in recreational and social activities) and
dopt more risky behaviors. However, traveling in groups and alternative forms of conflict resolution can reduce the
isk of victimization by physical assault. Schooling is associated with higher income, a fact that makes more schooled
ndividuals more attractive as targets. Also in this case, alternative forms of conflict resolution and improvements in the
ocial environment can reduce the rate of victimization by physical assault. Individuals who work are more exposed
o risks because their homes remain more unprotected when they are out working and their income might be higher,
nhancing their attractiveness to criminals. On the other hand, unemployment can increase the risk of physical assaults
f associated with alcohol abuse, spending long hours on the streets, partying, low self-esteem, conflicts in the family.
n sum, workers are more exposed to risks as they spend more time on the streets, their homes remain unprotected,
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Table 4
Coefficients estimated from repeat victimization models.
Variables Theft Robbery Attempted theft/robb. Physical assault
NB ZINB NB ZINB NB ZINB NB ZINB
ln(income) 0.138*** −0.150*** 0.147*** −0.175*** 0.145*** −0.187*** −0.104*** 0.0618***
(0.0210) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0346) (0.0204)
man 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.256*** 0.230*** 0.238*** 0.217*** 0.192*** 0.0988*
(0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0255) (0.0263) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0491) (0.0517)
white −0.0671** −0.0494* −0.0178 −0.011 0.00355 0.0182 −0.00258 −0.0756
(0.0313) (0.0298) (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0563) (0.0596)
married −0.185*** 0.233*** −0.330*** 0.368*** −0.182*** 0.222*** −0.641*** 0.415***
(0.0301) (0.0382) (0.0306) (0.0367) (0.0252) (0.0307) (0.0625) (0.0328)
age 0.0424*** −0.0504*** 0.0319*** −0.0334*** 0.0463*** −0.0511*** 0.0301*** −0.0127***
(0.00437) (0.00509) (0.00445) (0.00462) (0.00386) (0.00412) (0.00866) (0.00482)
agesq −0.000355*** 0.000428*** −0.000375*** 0.000379*** −0.000440*** 0.000477*** −0.000621*** 0.000330***
(0.0000478) (0.0000518) (0.0000525) (0.0000497) (0.0000435) (0.0000427) (0.000103) (0.0000547)
school 0.0259*** −0.0476*** 0.0637*** −0.0858*** 0.0488*** −0.0751*** −0.0317*** 0.0166***
(0.00374) (0.00567) (0.00381) (0.00657) (0.00326) (0.00489) (0.00744) (0.00429)
student 0.0293 −0.0821* 0.0763** −0.0583 0.0663** −0.114*** −0.339*** 0.237***
(0.0419) (0.0460) (0.0363) (0.0399) (0.0328) (0.0389) (0.0733) (0.0460)
ownveh −0.0255 −0.00177 −0.156*** 0.205*** −0.0728*** 0.0873*** −0.479*** 0.292***
(0.0313) (0.0361) (0.0304) (0.0301) (0.0276) (0.0298) (0.0616) (0.0365)
urban 0.656*** −0.716*** 1.281*** −0.925*** 0.872*** −0.735*** 0.718*** −0.548***
(0.0522) (0.0511) (0.0932) (0.0642) (0.0578) (0.0487) (0.0975) (0.0545)
house −0.116** 0.346*** −0.223*** 0.500*** −0.276*** 0.622***
(0.0508) (0.0975) (0.0477) (0.0783) (0.0442) (0.0791)
hwokrs 0.00736*** −0.0112*** 0.00936*** −0.0107*** 0.00670*** −0.00910***
(0.000680) (0.000883) (0.000742) (0.000747) (0.000619) (0.000680)
works 0.120** −0.126***
(0.0572) (0.0334)
cons −5.814*** −2.563*** −5.928*** −2.185*** −5.365*** −1.838*** −3.584*** −2.731***
(0.185) (0.0885) (0.181) (0.0872) (0.158) (0.0703) (0.350) (0.270)
Const.inflate 2.682* 2.740* 2.845* 0.272*
(0.173) (0.160) (0.156) (0.139)
ln α 2.512* 1.976* 2.248* 1.573* 2.188* 1.591* 3.933* 2.786*
(0.00311) (0.0559) (0.0362) (.0694) (0.0292) (0.0532) (0.0455) (0.0740)
Vuong test (ZINB vs. NB) z = 27.78 z = 38.48 z = 38.31 z = 17.92
p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000
N = 318, 759.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; the definitions of the variables are reported in Table 3.
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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heir income increases and, as a result, their attractiveness as targets to criminals increases. More working hours also
ncrease the risk of victimization.
Finally, higher-income individuals are more attractive to criminals. The distribution of income groups in space is not
andom: the affluent live in areas that are more exposed to property crimes but less exposed to crimes against persons.
n the other hand, higher-income people invest more in self-protection. Owning a vehicle is another proxy variable for
conomic attractiveness, especially for vehicle theft/robbery. Conversely, it reduces the use of public transportation,
hich can be a factor of protection.
As noted, for almost all variables there are good theoretical reasons to expect both positive and negative effects on
ictimization. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is that of investigating the net effect of these variables on repeat
ictimization, which we believe is not different from simple victimization (i.e. single victimization). We emphasize
hat our inferences of causality are only suggestive and tentative.
Before showing the empirical results for repeat victimization models, we analyze how the same variables affect
imple victimization. Table 5 shows the results of the simple victimization model, in which the same regressors were
sed.
The simple victimizations model suggests that some variables increase the likelihood of victimization: being male,
lder, living in urban areas, studying, working many hours a week and having higher incomes. In contrast, the sign is
egative (i.e. it decreases the likelihood of victimization) for factors such as being white or Asian (for consummated
heft only), being married, living in a house, and having a large family.
Regarding physical assault (crime against a person), it is interesting to note that most variables maintain their
ignificance and sign, but in some cases the sign appears inverted: studying and years of schooling increase the
ikelihood of property victimization, but for physical assault the effect is the opposite, i.e. it protects potential victims.
his demonstrates the need to distinguish the different types of crimes in the analysis, as suggested in Cohen et al.
1981).
When we compared the simple victimization model to the repeat victimization model, no major differences in terms
f signs of coefficients were found. In other words, the difference between the two phenomena is not in nature, but in
cale.
At this point, one must remember that the two hypotheses stated in Section 1: (i) income has a positive nonlinear
ffect on repeat victimization by property crimes (theft, robbery, attempted theft/robbery), and (ii) income has a negative
onlinear effect on repeat victimization by crimes against a person (physical assault). Table 6 shows the marginal effects
alculated from repeat victimization models.
Our results indicate that, on the one hand, income has a positive nonlinear effect on the amount of times an individual
as victimized by property crimes in a one-year period. On the other hand, evidence is provided of a negative nonlinear
ffect on physical assault. So the hypotheses tested here are not rejected. This evidence reinforces the economic
pproach, namely, that income determines victimization based on two factors: economic attractiveness and investment
n self-protection. This approach was presented in Section 2. The results also corroborate the sociological thesis
ccording to which wealthier people are less exposed to the risk of suffering aggravated physical aggression such as
hysical assault, for instance.
One can understand that the results found for the model of victimization by physical assault can be used as counter-
vidence of the robustness of the results found for the three property crimes analyzed in this study. We believe so,
articularly because in the case of physical assault the effect of income was negative, while for other crimes (against
roperty) it was positive.
The first important point to make is that the variables and sign found for simple victimization remains virtually
nchanged when we analyze the repeat victimization model. This piece of evidence reinforces our suspicion that the
et effect of the main variables on repeat victimization is the same when compared to simple victimization. Moreover,
t corroborates the idea that it is possible to use the traditional sociological approach proposed by Cohen et al. (1981)
o analyze repeat victimization as well. Similarly, the economic approach used in Gaviria and Pagés (2002) is also
seful for this purpose. This is an important issue that was clarified in this study.
Our results indicate that crimes increase in average if a person is male, older, lives in an urban area, studies or works,
s highly educated, works for many hours a week and has a higher income. On the other hand, a person is more protected
gainst repeat victimization if he or she is white or Asian (for consummated theft only). A protective relationship was
ound for married people and for those who live in a house. As in the case of simple victimization, the variables that
ontrol for being a student and having more years of schooling increase the chances of repeat victimization by property
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Table 5
Results from single victimization models.
Variables Theft Robbery Attempted theft/robb. Physical assault
Coef. Marg. effect Coef. Marg. effect Coef. Marg. effect Coef. Marg. effect
ln(income) 0.0619*** 0.00475*** 0.0698*** 0.00456*** 0.0726*** 0.00701*** −0.0379*** −0.00125***
(0.00690) (0.000533) (0.00751) (0.000493) (0.00670) (0.000646) (0.0106) (0.000349)
man 0.101*** 0.00781*** 0.101*** 0.00661*** 0.0898*** 0.00870*** 0.148*** 0.00493***
(0.00972) (0.000744) (0.00974) (0.000646) (0.00853) (0.000835) (0.0129) (0.000439)
white −0.0325*** −0.00249*** −0.0130 −0.000848 0.00663 0.000641 −0.0247 −0.000812
(0.0113) (0.000867) (0.0107) (0.000700) (0.0104) (0.00101) (0.0154) (0.000506)
married −0.0829*** −0.00628*** −0.143*** −0.00914*** −0.0866*** −0.00826*** −0.214*** −0.00680***
(0.0111) (0.000826) (0.0122) (0.000765) (0.0105) (0.000992) (0.0165) (0.000514)
age 0.0168*** 0.00129*** 0.0114*** 0.000743*** 0.0186*** 0.00180*** 0.0111*** 0.000365***
(0.00158) (0.000121) (0.00166) (0.000108) (0.00142) (0.000140) (0.00243) (0.0000794)
ageq −0.000149*** −0.0000114*** −0.000148*** −0.00000967*** −0.000185*** −0.0000179*** −0.000224*** −0.00000736***
(0.0000173) (0.00000133) (0.0000193) (0.00000126) (0.0000159) (0.00000156) (0.0000289) (0.000000942)
school 0.0124*** 0.000950*** 0.0292*** 0.00190*** 0.0231*** 0.00223*** −0.00794*** −0.000261***
(0.00141) (0.000107) (0.00151) (0.000101) (0.00132) (0.000126) (0.00203) (0.0000667)
student 0.0159 0.00123 0.0370** 0.00246** 0.0371*** 0.00365*** −0.116*** −0.00356***
(0.0159) (0.00124) (0.0155) (0.00106) (0.0141) (0.00141) (0.0228) (0.000657)
ownveh 0.00175 0.000134 −0.0810*** −0.00529*** −0.0276** −0.00267** −0.140*** −0.00463***
(0.0118) (0.000904) (0.0119) (0.000777) (0.0112) (0.00108) (0.0163) (0.000539)
urban 0.292*** 0.0188*** 0.508*** 0.0243*** 0.374*** 0.0293*** 0.289*** 0.00770***
(0.0192) (0.00104) (0.0343) (0.00104) (0.0238) (0.00146) (0.0294) (0.000614)
house −0.0579*** −0.00464*** −0.111*** −0.00790*** −0.130*** −0.0137***
(0.0194) (0.00162) (0.0191) (0.00147) (0.0185) (0.00211)
hwokrs 0.00344*** 0.000264*** 0.00394*** 0.000258*** 0.00319*** 0.000308***
(0.000274) (0.0000211) (0.000268) (0.0000179) (0.000232) (0.0000225)
works 0.0238 0.000780
(0.0163) (0.000532)
N = 318, 759.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; the definitions of the variables are reported in Table 3.
; * Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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Table 6
Marginal effects calculated from repeat victimization models.
Variables Theft Robbery Attempted theft/robb. Physical assault
NB ZINB NB ZINB NB ZINB NB ZINB
ln(income) 0.00644*** 0.00566*** 0.00524*** 0.00699*** 0.00906*** 0.0109*** −0.00215*** −0.00188***
(0.000972) (0.000768) (0.000683) (0.000750) (0.00109) (0.00101) (0.000722) (0.000645)
man 0.00973*** 0.0110*** 0.00920*** 0.0101*** 0.0150*** 0.0162*** 0.00400*** 0.00234*
(0.00116) (0.00133) (0.000911) (0.00117) (0.00132) (0.00154) (0.00104) (0.00122)
white −0.00313** −0.00263* −0.000635 −0.000483 0.000222 0.00135 −0.0000534 −0.00178
(0.00145) (0.00158) (0.000968) (0.00121) (0.00160) (0.00193) (0.00116) (0.00140)
married −0.00852*** −0.00884*** −0.0115*** −0.0145*** −0.0112*** −0.0129*** −0.0128*** −0.0123***
(0.00134) (0.00141) (0.00105) (0.00141) (0.00152) (0.00176) (0.00124) (0.00101)
age 0.00198*** 0.00191*** 0.00114*** 0.00134*** 0.00289*** 0.00296*** 0.000624*** 0.000387***
(0.000203) (0.000167) (0.000159) (0.000174) (0.000251) (0.000220) (0.000177) (0.000147)
agesq −0.0000165*** −0.0000162*** −0.0000134*** −0.0000151*** −0.0000274*** −0.0000276*** −0.0000128*** −0.0000100***
(0.00000223) (0.00000180) (0.00000187) (0.00000193) (0.00000279) (0.00000236) (0.00000209) (0.00000169)
school 0.00121*** 0.00180*** 0.00227*** 0.00343*** 0.00304*** 0.00435*** −0.000655*** −0.000505***
(0.000172) (0.000169) (0.000141) (0.000191) (0.000202) (0.000219) (0.000153) (0.000135)
student 0.00137 0.00310* 0.00278** 0.00234 0.00421** 0.00661*** −0.00645*** −0.00689***
(0.00199) (0.00173) (0.00135) (0.00161) (0.00213) (0.00224) (0.00129) (0.00131)
ownveh −0.00119 0.0000669 −0.00556*** −0.00819*** −0.00454*** −0.00505*** −0.01000*** −0.00884***
(0.00146) (0.00137) (0.00108) (0.00122) (0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00130) (0.00107)
urban 0.0249*** 0.0266*** 0.0315*** 0.0324*** 0.0416*** 0.0407*** 0.0119*** 0.0143***
(0.00161) (0.00158) (0.00138) (0.00175) (0.00205) (0.00244) (0.00129) (0.00124)
house −0.00569** −0.0126*** −0.00876*** −0.0201*** −0.0194*** −0.0341***
(0.00261) (0.00319) (0.00204) (0.00290) (0.00346) (0.00412)
hwork 0.000343* 0.000440* 0.000336* 0.000432* 0.000424* 0.000545*
(0.0000315) (0.0000323) (0.0000270) (0.0000282) (0.0000388) (0.0000368)
works 0.00246** 0.00380***
(0.00117) (0.00101)
N = 318, 759.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; the definitions of the variables are reported in Table 3; Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients.
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
308 M. Justus et al. / EconomiA 16 (2015) 295–309
crimes, but the effect is inverted in the case of repeat physical assault. The results also suggest that owning a vehicle
reduces the risk of victimization by robbery and assault, despite its economic attractiveness effect for criminals (see
Osborn et al., 1996). We also found that for some variables, such as being a student and years of schooling, the effect
is inverted according to the type of victimization, as risk factors turn into protective factors in the case of physical
assault.
5.  Concluding  remarks
When we compared the simple victimization model to the repeat victimization model, no major differences in terms
of signs of coefficients were found. In other words, the two phenomena differ not in nature, but in scale. Moreover, we
found that it is very important to distinguish the different types of crimes in the modeling.
We found evidence supporting the tested hypotheses that income has a positive nonlinear effect on the number of
times an individual was victimized by property crimes, but that it has a negative nonlinear effect on physical assault –
a crime against a person. The former result was also observed by Carvalho and Lavor (2008) for theft/robbery, and by
Lauritsen and Quinet (1995) for robbery in a sample of young people and adolescents in the United States. The latter
result was also observed by Lauritsen and Quinet (1995) for physical assault.
Our results corroborate the main evidence found by Carvalho and Lavor (2008), although the marginal effects
were different because three crimes against property were analyzed separately here. Moreover, the set of regressors is
different.
It must be said that while some risk factors can be modified through public policy or individual actions, others
simply cannot. Nobody can change one’s color, age or gender to prevent crime. No one will leave school or a job,
marry or purposely earn less just to reduce his or her exposure to the risk of victimization. It is also possible to move
or change one’s type of residence, but individuals rarely make such decisions for safety reasons alone.
Although we now have a better understanding of risk factors associated with victimization and repeat victimization,
they will continue to manifest themselves. Those who accumulate “risk factors” will continue to be more prone to
being victimized than others. There are additional reasons for repeat victimization: a first successful action on a target –
mainly on fixed targets such as homes or businesses – encourages criminals to repeat it. Also, if protection mechanisms
are damaged and not repaired, targets are exposed to the risk of new attacks. In any case, finding out variables that
increase or decrease the risk of exposure is not just an academic curiosity. When a group finds out that it belong to a
risk group it becomes more alert. Such target group is thus led to review risk behaviors and take more precautions than
others.
Finally, it must be said that, according to data from the 2009 PNAD survey, the feeling of insecurity in Brazil
increases significantly as the per capita household income rises. For example, in the metropolitan area of São Paulo,
42.9% of all individuals with a per capita household income below one-quarter of the minimum wage felt safe. This
percentage decreases as the income level increases, to the point of being up to 12.7 percentage points lower for two or
more people earning minimum wages. On the other hand, people tend to invest more in self-protection equipment to
reduce the risk of victimization when they are victimized more than once, i.e. when they suffer repeat victimization. The
questionnaire of the 2009 PNAD survey includes several questions about the use of safety devices for self-protection
in one’s home. But the response is binary, yes or no, so it is not possible to know how much money the individuals
are spending on self-protection. Moreover, this variable is clearly endogenous. We cannot know, for example, if their
investments in self-protection were made before or after their first victimization. For this reason, we chose not to use this
variable as a regressor. But the role of self-protection in repeat victimization was at least partially controlled for when
household income was taken into account. However, finding a set of valid instruments for the use of self-protection
means would be an advance.
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